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METHODS: SOFTWARE, REVIEWS, NOTICES 
FQS Debates: Standards of Qualitative Social Research 
Franz Breuer and Jo Reichertz∗ 
Abstract: As moderators of the FQS' debate on the stan-
dards of qualitative social research, we remind the partici-
pants and the readers of the vastness and the variety of crite-
ria involved in the discourse of philosophy of science. We 
present impressions on the change of these criteria in recent 
discussions. We urge the participants of this debate to be-
come aware of the systematic and historical character of 
postulated criteria. 
1. Introduction 
As long as scientists work for universities or institutes, they must engage in 
different activities besides their research: they teach, give exams and carry out 
administrative duties. In all these domains own independent problems of action 
have to be solved. This implies that there is no common orientation for action 
within these fields. Instead we find a historically grown and socially assured 
logic of action in each of these fields, i.e. a set of rules and procedures and how 
to work on and solve this central problem of action.  
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First of all doing research is work-sometimes well paid, sometimes less well 
paid, and sometimes (especially during the phase of qualification) you get no 
financial reward whatsoever. In taking a closer look at science as work, one 
realises that this work is a result of processes of social differentiation and con-
sists of a range of (not always) disparate subtasks, each of which has a logic of 
its own. For all these fields of scientific endeavours, we find socially negotiated 
and often very different goodness criteria. For a further debate on goodness 
criteria for qualitative social research we therefore propose to specify the area 
or aspect of goodness which is referred to in each case.  
On the one hand, we try to stimulate the discussion with the following con-
siderations about the goodness criteria for qualitative social research; on the 
other hand, we try guide and moderate the FQS-Debate. We have attempted to 
articulate and detail these goodness criteria; the result is an outline of ideas, 
which we hope will be further elaborated and articulated in subsequent contri-
butions from our readers.  
2. About the Situation and the Intention 
In the course of history we find a multifaceted and rich debate about goodness 
criteria in science. In the inner-scientific (epistemological) discourse of the 
modern times we traditionally find those of epistemology and methodology in 
the first line. In the 20th century we observe a strong emphasis in this "arena of 
discourse" on the idea of "demarcation" and on the idea that scientific knowl-
edge has an epistemological priority opposed to other human ways of knowl-
edge and understanding, as well as an emphasis on the idea of value-free sci-
ence ("Werturteilsfreiheit")-i.e. scientific reasoning and scientific criteria are 
said to be detached from "trans-scientific" social and practical implications.  
A distinction between "inner-scientific" and "outer-scientific" conditions, 
processes and argumentation was introduced to protect this notion: By doing so 
the undeniable historical interactions of social norms, morality, economy, pro-
duction, and warfare, on the one hand, and science, on the other hand, can be 
kept out of the (inner-scientific) discourse, e.g. the discourse on goodness- and 
quality-criteria. In this respect, this distinction can be seen as a result of the 
scientists' successful struggle against the paternalism of the church and the 
state.  
Due to analyses in the history and sociology of science the normative and 
idealistic self-conception of science (characterised by the maxims of rational-
ity, truth and self-sufficiency) has become questionable-especially in the last 
third of the 20th century. For instance, the KUHNian description of theory 
shifts in the natural sciences (KUHN 1973) and micro-sociological descriptions 
of scientific production processes (following MANNHEIM's tradition of apply-
ing the theory of knowledge self-reflexively to science) have revealed the re-
stricted, limited, and questionable conception and monopoly of rationality and 
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the importance of social structures and processes for scientific knowledge 
production.  
This more descriptive perspective on science-in-the-making represents a vi-
tal challenge to the common, normative ideal of rationality. In practice, scien-
tific research works with fundamentally different "logics" than those of enact-
ing an epistemological and methodical canon-especially when it is successful. 
The theory of knowledge and understanding is a strategy of justification, con-
ceived by those who work with exactly this strategy to earn a living (by doing 
research). Looking at the history of science one finds that the examples of new 
insights that were brought to light while obeying the rules of the theory of 
knowledge and understanding are few. Often enough intuition, coincidence, 
self-interest and stubbornness engendered new ideas.  
This disenchantment of the idealised demands of science involved a "profa-
nation" of scientific work. In a more realistic approach science proves to be less 
withdrawn from other human products: Science is shaped by contextual (social, 
linguistic, interactive, medial, cognitive, etc.) conditions that have their own 
criteria and their specific influences and constraints on the way scientific think-
ing and working are carried out. The epistemological discussion has acknowl-
edged this dependence of scientific work on contextual structures and proc-
esses. But it is quite a different question how this issue is dealt with in an ar-
gumentation of objectivity-e.g. when propagating empirical research results or 
raising funds for future research. It fundamentally weakens the "persuasive-
ness" of research results. Dependent on the context of discourse and the audi-
ence this relativisation is revealed or hidden.  
When it comes to discussing goodness or quality criteria of the (qualitative) 
social sciences in such a situation it makes sense to undertake a systematic 
"stock-taking" of the postulated and enacted judgement criteria that play them-
selves out in routine scientific research. On the one hand, this serves to clarify 
the discourse. From our point of view various disputes in this field arise, be-
cause different authors refer to diverse levels of quality or domains without 
making this explicit (to the reader or to him-/herself). This results in polarities 
that can be solved by taking in a meta-perspective. On the other hand, it seems 
necessary to us to discuss and clarify the broad spectrum of quality standards 
that play a role in inner- and outer-scientific discourses. Only by doing so can 
we balance the (often implicit) preferences and value-decisions that play a role 
in scientific production processes (when raising funds, interacting with research 
partners, publishing research reports etc.). Here one must take into account that 
one can undertake an analytical differentiation of levels, but when it comes to 
actual research situations and discourses, the criteria are linked and correlated 
in various ways.  
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3. A Systematisation of Domains and Levels of  
Goodness-Criteria 
It is not easy to organise the discourse domain concerning goodness criteria for 
scientific research, because the particular debates partly overlap and the argu-
ments do not always belong to the same argumentative levels. Our systematisa-
tion can therefore be only a first attempt. We suggest eight standards and do-
mains: Goodness (a) based on the logic of justification, (b) based on the logic 
of discovery, (c) based on honesty and integrity of the scientists, (d) based on 
methodological appropriateness, (e) as a result of human ethics, (f) as practical 
relevance of research, (g) based on scientists' politics of representation, and (h) 
as a result of external science evaluation. Below, we take up each of these 
issues.  
3.1 Goodness based on the logic of justification 
General justifying methodological criteria of the empirical sciences: Orienting 
to the idea of a unitary science ("Einheitswissenschaft") a standard canon of 
goodness criteria for the empirical sciences has emerged in the dominating 
epistemological traditions of the last century (i.e. Logical Empiricism and 
Critical Rationalism and their followers). This standard canon contains specific 
logical and methodological maxims-not regarding differential object character-
istics or discipline specifics-which still characterise conventional methodology 
textbooks in the social sciences.  
In this context, prototypical aspects that refer to linguistic and conceptual char-
acteristics and the relationship between scientific symbolisation or symbol 
systems, on the one hand, and reality, on the other hand, could be: 
- conceptual accuracy/precision 
- intersubjective clear/unequivocal concepts and statements 
- objective use of concepts and statements 
- reliable observations, measurements, etc. 
- logical consistency of statements and statement systems 
- empirical testability of statements concerning reality 
- level of confirmation of statements 
- representive statements for situations and persons 
- validity 
- truth of empirical statements 
- aesthetics/simplicity and economy of theories 
- power/capacity of integration.  
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3.2 Goodness based on the logic of discovery 
Conventional philosophy of science has identified the discovery and develop-
ment of scientific knowledge and scientific theories as an area of reasoning, but 
in terms of its criteria this aspect has not been elaborated. Instead, it is often 
assigned to the "psychology of scientific working" and therefore excluded from 
the epistemological and methodological sphere.  
Here, certain kinds of conclusions and argumentations play an important 
role, including, for instance, inductive and abductive procedures and methods 
of inventing and discovering new knowledge. But these procedures cannot 
sufficiently guarantee certainty of knowledge. In discourses you find insuffi-
ciently systematised criteria, such as "creativity", "innovation", "stimulating 
content", and "surprise effect".  
3.3 Goodness based on honesty and integrity of the scientists 
One recent discussion is concerned with the fundamental aspects of "honesty" 
and "integrity". In the conventional self-conception of the scientific community 
there is no need to expound on the problems of these concepts. Scientists are 
not permitted to lie, cheat, fake their results, or claim the merits belonging to 
others.  
Instructed by startling violations of such maxims, some (e.g. in Germany an 
expert committee of the "Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft") take steps to 
ensure good scientific practice. A canon of institutional sanctions and personal 
obligations shall reduce the danger of "scientific malpractice". Maxims and 
criteria refer to documentation and storage of data, legitimate identification of 
authorship (of texts), conflict management, and institutional procedures to 
control the standards to maintain emphasis on "qualitative" as opposed to 
"quantitative" characteristics of scientific production.  
3.4 Goodness as methodological appropriateness:  
self reflection and perspective taking 
A number of aspects concerning the dependency of quality criteria and charac-
teristics of the specific object of scientific knowledge have been introduced-
typically criticising the idea of a unitary science (inspired by the natural sci-
ences) for the social sciences and humanities. This is about epistemological 
considerations concerning the relationship between the structure of the episte-
mological object and appropriate scientific research methods. The basic argu-
ment arises from the fact that in their attempts to generate knowledge the social 
sciences and humanities are concerned with a self-same object: the epistemo-
logical subject (knower, knowing society) and epistemological object (known) 
are identical and are therefore, in principle, interchangeable. This identity 
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makes this research fundamentally different from research in the natural sci-
ences and, for example, is the very foundation of introspective methods. Fol-
lowing this view it is not a methodology (indifferent to the object of research) 
that decides on scientific appropriateness but adequate "fittingness" of the 
structure of the object and research methods-whereupon the object's structure is 
most important.  
In this context, considerations concerning the adequacy of scientific con-
cepts arise that pertain to "modelling", the "image of man", and the "representa-
tion" of epistemological objects. One important aspect is that the object be-
comes constituted as a source of knowledge because of its representation (con-
struction of the other-"othering"). The choice of scientific methods and the 
perspective (observer, participant) determines what the object will appear to be 
and what characteristics of the object will be observed. Structural characteris-
tics of the interaction between the epistemological subject (scientist) and the 
epistemological object ("subject", research participant) greatly influence the 
conceptualisation of the object and the possible research results.  
In different traditions and disciplines one finds the following maxims: 
- Self reflexivity of the epistemological "objects": the ability of the epis-
temological objects to give information about themselves, to think 
about themselves, etc. is a constitutive characteristic of the object of re-
search. 
- "Levelling" of the social relation between epistemological subject and 
object: "subjects" become research participants and co-researchers; un-
der certain circumstances the epistemological "object" is treated as an 
expert for his or her contexts. 
- Reflexivity: theories in the social and human sciences as well as the ob-
ject/subject-models they include must not only apply to the epistemo-
logical object but also to the epistemological subject (the experiencing 
and acting scientist). 
- Reflection of the demarcation between epistemological subject and ob-
ject in the human and social sciences: substantiated decisions have to be 
made regarding the location in the transactional relationship between 
epistemological subject and object where data will be taken (on the 
"distal"-"proximal"-continuum; s. DEVEREUX 1968). 
- Specification of vital categorical "object"-characteristics within the 
scope of an agreed-upon "historical-empirical process" (HOLZKAMP 
1983). 
- Multi-perspective descriptions: The (often diverging) descriptions of 
objects from the perspectives of different participators or observers are 
interesting with regard to the gain of in-depth information about the ob-
server and its object.  
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3.5 Goodness as a result of human ethics  
Taking into account the ethics of interaction between the (structurally identical) 
epistemological subject and object as well as the scientist's responsibility to 
protect the issues of his or her research partner, a number of criteria have been 
evolved. Often professional scientific incorporations formulate these criteria in 
codes of ethics that apply to all of their members. These codes usually leave 
considerable room for interpretation. Among them you find codes such as not 
to do any physical, social, and mental harm to the participants, to tell them the 
truth (if possible), and to respect their right for privacy while working on the 
data. According to these research projects that stick to human ethics in their 
interaction with the participants are considered "good". Scientists often find 
these aspects annoying, because they represent restrictions to their scope of 
action in their field of research. The practical scientific significance and effec-
tiveness of these criteria often arise only when appeals and warnings of a "criti-
cal public" get loud.  
3.6 Goodness as practical relevance of scientific research  
Quality characteristics of scientific research results that have become increas-
ingly important are the practical applicability, usefulness, and utilisation in 
technical, economic and social contexts ("technological relevance").  
These criteria prove to be complex: On the one hand, producers of scientific 
knowledge often take a distanced approach to this aspect, because knowledge-
just like art-is considered as valuable per se without taking practical usefulness 
into account, and insofar they postulate the "freedom of science" (often prom-
ised in social contracts). On the other hand, recent history has shown that for 
scientific knowledge that is supposed to have only little practical relevance 
(e.g. in basic research), domains can be found or searched for in which this 
knowledge gains high practical relevance. Opposed to this the actors in the 
scientific process can produce counterproductive effects by intentionally orient-
ing to ephemeral practical relevance. Projects that focus on the practical im-
plementation of knowledge can turn into a perishable good.  
Besides this practical relevance (or as HABERMAS and HOLZKAMP say: 
"technical relevance") of scientific research-i.e. the principal possibility to 
utilise scientific knowledge without regard to value characteristics of the pur-
poses for which they are used-the aspect of the interest-oriented relevance is 
introduced (following HABERMAS 1965, HOLZKAMP 1972 calls this 
"emancipatory relevance"). Starting from ethical and sociological theories the 
utilisation of scientific knowledge can be rated with respect to certain interests 
or interested parties. For the human and social sciences this can be illustrated 
by looking at the following comparison: Do the research results serve the 
"other directedness" or "manipulation" of social dependencies/relationships in 
 265
the sense of any ("dominating") interests or interested parties? Or do they per-
mit self-knowledge of the epistemological subject/object concerning its living 
conditions and stimulate a stronger control over them (i.e. do they permit self 
reflection, self development and expansion of control over acting opportuni-
ties)? Obviously it is hard to arrive at this criterion by "intentional action"-in 
spite of many "partial" attempts in the social sciences of the 70s and 80s.  
3.7 Goodness based on the scientists' politics of representation 
Aspects of goodness of scientific work that directly or indirectly arise from the 
scientists' impression management and social politics are of special interest for 
social scientist and bear a high risk. Micro-sociological studies on real research 
processes (ethnographies of scientific "laboratories" or of the production of 
scientific texts) describe a number of practices and practised criteria that only 
partially have to do with common "quality criteria". Instead, the scientists are 
predominantly concerned with adjusting, aligning, and self-representing to 
inner and outer scientific co-players and recipients. (Does a scientist have a 
nose for trendy and modern ideas, practices, persons, etc.? Can he or she dem-
onstrate his or her being up-to-date, his or her group membership in a convinc-
ing manner?)  
These characteristics can be subsumed under the term "staging". For instance, 
they can refer to aspects like: 
- Following current foci of public (medial, political etc.) discussions, 
- following current booms of scientific theories or "paradigms", 
- using the most prestigious instruments and procedures (the fastest, big-
gest computer, the most innovative data analysis, etc.), 
- techniques of textual representation-e.g. conformity with standard 
schemata for text production, but also comprehensibility to laymen, en-
tertaining qualities, etc., 
- social anchoring in scientific networks, societies, insider relationships, 
power structures, etc., 
- access to certain presentation media, 
- co-operating with private and commercial instances (contacts with "the 
businesses and "the media", etc.), 
- tactical skills in dealing with experts, bureaucracy, sponsors, etc.  
The more the particular scientist manages to be successful in different domains 
and arenas the higher the quality of his or her work will rank. It seems to us 
that these action and actor characteristics are currently very important, and that 
they play a considerable role in the construction of (social, economic) success 
or failure of scientific activities and their protagonists.  
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3.8 Goodness as a result of external science evaluation 
Certain procedures for the "evaluation" of scientific accomplishments have 
recently seen the light of day-especially due to science-external pressures on 
the allocation of resources in scientific research routine. These procedures are 
said to allow a differentiation between scientific top performance and average 
performance. In doing so different "indicators" and "measures" are being in-
vented or adopted that claim to make a quality differentiation possible.  
These are only sparsely orientated to the traditional epistemological criteria. 
Instead, they emphasise "non-theoretical" characteristics that can easily be 
operationalised and quantified, i.e., economic standards and "social resonance" 
of scientific research. Such aspects represent discussed candidates for the 
"ranking" of persons and institutions in the context of science politics, they are 
becoming propaganda instruments in the context of adapting to the market-
economy and of competition between universities, research facilities, profes-
sional trainings, and so on.  
Examples for this domain: 
- Amount of texts a scientist publishes or members of an institution pub-
lish, 
- acceptance of publications in certain "high-ranking" journals or pub-
lishing houses (i.e. according to evaluation by the expert culture), 
- frequency of quotation of authors/publications in selective statistics 
("impact-factor" etc.), 
- gaining of governmental and private subsidies or sponsors, 
- editing of (famous) periodicals, 
- characteristics of education of an institution, 
- age of a scientist, 
- gender of a scientist.  
Works of authors that rank high in these external criteria are considered "im-
portant".  
4. Impressions on the Historical Change in Criteria Prioritisation 
In the epistemological discussion up to the 1970s (which used to be very im-
portant at least for scientific research at universities) we mainly find inner-
scientific epistemological and methodological aspects of quality evaluation 
(prototypes: objectivity, reliability, validity, truth).  
Arising from the discussion on political administrative planning of "big sci-
ence" (allocation of resources, prioritisation of research) as well as from politi-
cally "left" science critics, practical or technical relevance as a goodness crite-
rion became more and more important in these days.  
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In the 1980s and 1990s disillusion and scepticism arose in the field of tradi-
tional inner-scientific quality criteria: The idea that scientific knowledge repre-
sents reality lost followers. The epistemological orientation changed towards 
relativity and discursive nature of scientific knowledge. The criteria that used 
to be considered relatively unproblematic became questionable and obsolete in 
the "internal debate" of most social sciences.  
The trans-scientific political criteria of science producers shifted from a 
commitment to social progress (or at least from discussing this demand) to-
wards an orientation to stock exchange and particular, ideational, social and 
economic "capitals".  
In doing so, science has increasingly lost the chances of arriving at certainty 
of knowledge. Instead, the inner-scientific discourse has to offer a colourful 
diversity of more or less exotic and "postmodern" aspects (e.g. aesthetics and 
entertainment) that have only little to do with the former "serious" ambitions. If 
one can no longer rely on inner-scientific goodness criteria, one inevitably has 
to use other standards.  
The non-scientific public shows astonishment or lack of interest in this 
withdrawal from the claim to validity of scientific knowledge. Furthermore the 
desolate nature of scientific knowledge production often shows in public dis-
course: In cases when a decision is insecure one can find, as the popular adage 
goes, "three scientific experts with four different opinions". The public no 
longer gives credit to scientific problem solving and autonomy. External other-
directedness increasingly replaces internal or self-control in science. But the 
gain in efficiency appears problematic: The "transactional costs" for the pre-
dominant slogan "substitute control for confidence" (panels, application proc-
esses, etc.) are now considerable.  
The scientific community and the non-scientific public have been equally 
disenchanted by science and scientific knowledge. In this context science has 
lost its legitimacy and chances for self-directedness. This not only applies to 
questions of "big science" concerning allocations of huge research-investments, 
but also influences science and scientific decisions in fundamental ways: 
"Evaluation" of science, of professional training, and so on is a continuous 
boom everywhere in any possible or impossible manner. The participants in 
this "science game" are being expelled from their "ivory tower" of inner-
scientific legitimation of projects and are being forced into social (non scien-
tific, e.g. economic, administrative, and mass medial) discourses that heretofore 
have been unfamiliar to scientists. This is a complex and often contradictory 
process: In addition to bringing a breath of fresh air into scientists' stuffy au-
thoritarian arrogance-a decidedly democratic process-politicians, investors, and 
the mass media now have unrestricted access to decisions on scientific priori-
ties, projects and research concepts (marketing of knowledge production).  
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5. Conclusions 
We conclude: The levels of legitimacy and criteria on which scientific projects 
have to be based, have fundamentally changed over the past twenty years: they 
have been widened and diversified. The relevant discourse contexts have be-
come more numerous and often more differentiated. Here we find a movement 
away from inner-scientific discourses about goodness criteria towards external 
discourses, i.e., those criteria that are common in economy, politics, and com-
munication. Because of these new aspects, a different "mix" or "profile" of 
standards of criteria has emerged. In our view, these discourses have lost a 
common reference point. The fundamental question is therefore, "Should sci-
ence now submit to the logic of economy, politics, and the media after it took 
centuries to liberate itself from church and state?" Does science give up its 
monopoly for the methodological decisions in the production of assured 
knowledge to receive, in return, financial and symbolic resources? 
To arrive at a clarifying and future-oriented discussion about good-
ness/quality criteria in (qualitative) social research it is not useful to follow a 
momentary "zeitgeist" of debates on criteria, quality and evaluation (modifying 
a statement of LAKATOS [1972] about KUHN: to be taken in by a "mob psy-
chology"). It is also not useful to postulate quality standards "per se". Instead 
we suggest to begin by unfolding and explicating a broad spectrum of signifi-
cant and interesting arguments.  
Moreover the structures and requirements of the social and scientific con-
texts and discourses, to which these standards (or their aggregations) are ap-
plied, have to be articulated and tested with respect to their relevance for scien-
tific work (also reflecting their historical change). It is only on this basis that 
we can adequately weight and balance the different aspects (for particular 
contexts) and, perhaps, develop profiles of different criteria. Adopt-
ing/accepting criteria always implies a value decision-and the question: Which 
values can I represent on the basis of my self-conception as a (qualitative) 
social scientist, considering the research question, database, scientific dis-
courses, goodness standards, and overall consequences of my research? A 
responsible answer to these questions leaves (that is our hope) no margin for 
arbitrariness.  
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